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1. INTRODUCrION
On November 30, 1999, representatives of 135 countries in the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") met in Seattle to agree on an
agenda for the next round of negotiations. They were greeted by
30,000 to 40,000 protesters, primarily from labor, environmental,
and human rights organizations who, for a time, blocked their en-
try into the meeting hall. The root of their protest was that the
WTO, in developing its rules and procedures for promoting free
trade, had not given adequate, or any, consideration to labor rights,
environmental problems, or human rights.
On December 1, President Clinton, when addressing the repre-
sentatives, revived a long-standing contentious issue within the
WTO: whether free trade should be tied to labor, environmental,
and human rights. President Clinton declared:
I believe the W.T.O. must make sure that open trade does
indeed lift living standards, respects core labor standards
that are essential not only to worker rights, but to human
rights. That's why this year the United States has proposed
that the W.T.O. create a working group on trade and labor.1
He further inflamed the issue by making an unplanned state-
ment to a newspaper that the trade group should at some point use
sanctions to enforce core labor rights around the world.2 Clinton's
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1 Clinton's Plea: 'Open the Meetings', N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al.
2 Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to
Agenda Fails, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 3,1999, at Al.
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statement provoked an adamant response from developing coun-
tries, which saw any tying of trade to labor or environmental rights
as disguised protectionism by developed countries to keep out ex-
ports from developing countries and stymie their development. A
Pakistani representative threatened, "We will block consensus on
every issue if the United States proposal goes ahead,"3 and the
Egyptian representative warned, "If you start using trade as a lever
to implement non-trade issues, that will be the end of the multilat-
eral trading system ... ."4 All efforts to compromise on, or tempo-
rarily bury, the contentious trade issue and move on to problems
of copyright, agricultural subsidies, investments, genetically modi-
fied foods, and dumping failed. After four days, the conference
adjourned with no results, not even a press statement, leaving all
of the troublesome pending problems untouched.5
The newspapers, in reporting the Battle in Seattle, focused on
the demonstrations in the streets, which were but a symptom of the
underlying division in the meeting hall. Thomas Friedman, in a
New York Times editorial column entitled, Senseless in Seattle, dis-
missed the protestors as a "Noah's ark of flat-earth advocates,
protectionist trade unions and yuppies."6 The Economist described
them as a "furious rag-bag of anti-globalisation protestors" 7 and
"militant dunces parad[ing] their ignorance through the streets of
Seattle." 8 Such dismissive commentaries ignored or denied the
fundamental issue involved.
Seattle was no surprise; it was only the eruption of issues long
suppressed. 9 In the original GATT negotiations in 1948, the United
States had sought to include some reference to labor rights, but be-
cause of opposition it was dropped.10 It was again raised infor-
mally in the Tokyo Round in 1978, but it received no support ex-
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, Impasse on Trade Delivers Stinging Blow
to Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4,1999, at Al.
6 Thomas L. Friedman, Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A23.
7 The New Trade War, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4,1999, at 25.
8 Clueless in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4,1999, at 17.
9 For a history of the linkage of trade to human rights and labor rights, see
Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause, (GATT,
ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws) in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 177 (Iagdish Bhag-
wati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1997).
10 See Peter S. Watson, The Framework for the New Trade Agenda, 25 LAW &
PoL'Y. INT'L Bus. 1237,1253 (1994).
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cept from the Nordic countries, and the United States made no
formal proposal.1 In the 1994 Uruguay Round, the United States
proposed a study committee on the relation of free trade to basic
labor rights, but the developing countries opposed it, arguing that
the trade organization was not the proper organization to deal
with labor rights, which, they maintained, should be left to the
competent body, the International Labor Organization ("ILO").12
The ILO had more than 170 conventions on labor rights, but no en-
forcement powers. It could investigate and make findings and rec-
ommendations, but it had no sanctions other than "jaw boning",
which many violators regularly ignored 3 This weakness of the
ILO was well known and recognized by the developing countries,
and the effect of leaving the labor rights issue to the ILO was to re-
ject any protection of labor rights. The issue was again raised by
the United States in the Singapore ministerial conference in 1996,
but was again shunted to the ILO, which was called "the compe-
tent body to deal with labor standards", even though its only com-
petence was to issue statements.1 4
2. BASIC LABOR RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Tying free trade to the recognition of basic labor rights has long
been an articulated policy of the United States, reflected in the
General System of Preferences of 1971,15 the Caribbean Basin Re-
11 See id. at 1253.
12 See id. at 1254; R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational En-
terprises and International Labor Standards: Which Way for Development and Jobs?, in
HuMAN RiGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141 (Lance A. Compa &
Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
13 Elisabeth Cappuyns, Linking Labor Standards and Trade Sanctions: An Analy-
sis of Their Current Relationship, 36 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 659, 6S0-84 (1998). For
a different perspective on the role of the ILO, see Christopher R. Coxson, Th7 1998
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights at Work. Promoting Labor Law Reforms
Through the ILO as an Alternative to Trade Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INTLL. 469 (1999).
14 Ministers of Singapore addressed the question of core labor standards and
reaffirmed their commitment to observance of internationally recognized stan-
dards. They also recognized the competence of the ILO to set and deal with these
standards, while voting that economic growth and development fostered by in-
creased trade and trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of such stan-
dards. The Ministers rejected the use of labor standards for protectionist pur-
poses, recognizing that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low
wage developing countries, should not be put in jeopardy. See WVTO, 1997
ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1997) [hereinafter WTO REPORT].
15 Trade Act of 1974,19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994).
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covery Act of 1983,16 and the Overseas Investment Corporation
Amendment of 1985,17 in which trade benefits were given on the
countries' recognition of minimum labor standards. In 1992, can-
didate Clinton insisted that NAFTA include a labor side agree-
ment. 8 When negotiated, the side agreement listed eleven labor
principles, which included the core labor standards.19 In the year
preceding Seattle, President Clinton in at least three speeches in-
sisted that trade be tied to labor rights so as "to put a human face
on the global economy."20 The United States was not alone. It was
supported by some, though not all, European countries, the Euro-
pean Parliament, and the World Confederation of Trade Unions,
which represented 213 union federations in 143 countries. 21 One
year prior to Seattle, a mass demonstration protesting the WTO's
refusal to protect the environment, labor rights, or human rights
had paralyzed the offices of the WTO in Geneva.22
The Battle in Seattle in the streets did not cause the trade talks
to collapse in the meeting hall. The demonstrations were the
product of a long-standing basic cleavage between the developed
and developing countries on whether trade should be left free from
all restraints or whether that freedom should be conditional on ad-
16 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1953, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707
(1994).
17 Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2200 (1994). The labor
rights protected in these three statutes did not include protection against dis-
crimination, but included the right to "acceptable conditions of work and regard
to minimum wages, hours and acceptable conditions of safety." Gadbaw &
Medwig, supra note 12, at 144. These statutes had limited effectiveness because of
their vague standards and lack of enforcement. See Alston, Labor Rights Provisions
in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism" in COMPA & DIAMOND, supra note 12,
at 71.
18 William Jefferson Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating American Jobs, J.
ENVr'L. L. 682,685 (1993).
19 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAACL"), Sept. 13,
1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499, annex I.
20 William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President at the University of
Chicago Convocation Ceremonies, June 12, 1999, available at http://www.news.
uchicago.edu/releases/99/990612.clinton-speech.shtml. See ILO, CONFERENCES AT
GENEVA (1999); IMF/WORLD BANK, ANNUAL MEETING (1999); Steve Chamovitz,
The Globalization of Economic Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 113 (1999).
21 See Cappuyns, supra note 13, at 667; ICFTU, International Trade Has to Take
Account of Labour Standards, Says World Union, at http://www.icflcu.org.english
/pr/1999/eprol 118-990617-dd.html (June 17,1997).
22 See Elizabeth Olson, Target Practice in Geneva on the Global Trade Body, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16,1998, at D1.
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herence to basic labor rights.23 More specifically, the protests in-
voked the question of whether a member country could restrict
imports produced in violation of basic labor rights. 4 President
Clinton's declarations concerning tying free trade to basic labor
rights would almost certainly have caused the talks to collapse had
there been no demonstrations, once it became clear that the United
States and others were no longer willing to suppress the issue.
Although the demonstration in the streets included human rights
advocates and environmentalists in addition to workers and union
members, the dispute in the hall was about labor rights.
But what, specifically, was the issue? Clinton's proposal was
simply to create a working group to study and discuss the possible
application of some "core" labor standards in achieving free trade.
Although the working group was only to study and discuss the
question, developing countries feared that the study would ulti-
mately result in the WTO adopting and enforcing workers' rights.
Protection of workers' rights would provide a guise for developed
countries to deprive developing countries of their competitive ad-
vantage of low labor costs by excluding exports produced in viola-
tion of those rights, thereby stifling their ability to develop indus-
tries and raise living standards.
The proposal, however, was narrowly limited. It was to con-
sider only "core" labor standards, which are defined in the ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work as: (1)
freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to bar-
gain collectively; (2) elimination of all forms of forced labor; (3) ef-
fective abolition of child labor; and (4) elimination of discrimina-
tion in employment and occupation.25 These "core" labor rights
have been designated by the ILO as the four fundamental rights
that all members of the ILO are obligated "to respect, promote and
realize in good faith," regardless of whether the member has rati-
23 See generally Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law:
The U.S. Approach, 9 CoMIP. LAB. L.J. 253 (1988) (discussing legislation regulating
U.S. trade and other economic relations); Cappuyns, supra note 13.
24 Violations of WTO trading rules may be sanctioned by fines or damages, or
by allowing other countries to impose retaliatory trade measures. In case of vio-
lations of core labor rights, the most likely sanction would be to allow an import-
ing country to impose duties on or bar goods produced in violation of those
rights.
25 Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles, International Labor
Conference, 86th Sess. (1998) (adopted), available at http://wv%.ilo.org/public/
english/standards /relm/ilc/ilc86/com-decl.htm.
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fled relevant ILO conventions.26 In short, President Clinton's pro-
posal was to study whether free trade should be conditioned on
the observance of rights that the United States, along with 180
other countries, is obligated to uphold by virtue of its membership
in the ILO.
It is crucial to recognize three characteristics of these core labor
rights. First, these rights do not focus on low wages. Forced labor
is prohibited not because goods produced under such conditions
compete unfairly, but because it denies workers their freedom.
Child labor is prohibited not because it is cheap but because chil-
dren's growth and development should not be stunted by wage
work. Even if a child were paid the same wage as her father, al-
lowing her to enter the labor market would violate this standard.
The operative principle is that children should be shielded from
the burdens of wage labor. Prohibition of discrimination reaches
beyond wage costs to protect workers' equal right to work and the
right to equal treatment on the job, as a part of their basic human
right to be treated equally. The right to free association and collec-
tive bargaining is protected as a human right regardless of whether
the union is able to bargain for a living wage.
There is no suggestion that there should be a global minimum
wage or that a right to a "fair wage" or even a "living wage" is a
core labor right. There is general acceptance that the differential in
wages due to the availability of cheap labor serves as a legitimate
comparative advantage in international trade and that low wage
countries should not be deprived of this advantage. It should be
noted that the European Union over a period of forty years has es-
tablished uniform standards on a multitude of labor rights, 27 but it
26 See Coxson, supra note 13, at 470-71 (stating that members of the ILO must
adhere to four fundamental principles of labor and employment law).
27 See, e.g., Council Directive 75/117/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws
of the Member States Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for
Men and Women, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19; Council Directive 75/129/EEC on the Ap-
proximation of the Laws of Member States for Collective Redundancies, 1975 0J.
(L 48) 28; Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in the Event of
Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of Businesses, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26;
Council Directive 94/45/EC on the Establishment of a European Works Council,
1994 O.J. (L 254) 64; Council Directive 96/34/EC on the Framework Agreement on
Parental Leave, 1996 O.J. (L 145) 4; Council Directive 91/383/EEC Supplementing
the Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of
Workers with a Fixed-Duration Employment Relationship or a Temporary Em-
ployment Relationship, 1991 O.J. (L 206) 19.
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has not even considered establishing a community-wide minimum
wage. The comparative advantage of the differential in wage rates
is preserved.
Second, these core labor rights are, at most, minimal. They en-
compass only seven of the ILO Conventions, all seven of which are
almost universally accepted.28 One hundred twenty-seven coun-
tries have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Associa-
tion and the Right to Organize; 145 have ratified Convention No.
98 on the Right to Bargain collectively; 141 countries have ratified
Convention No. 111 on Discrimination; 151 countries have ratified
Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor; and 84 countries have ratified
Convention No. 138 on Child Labor.29 It is ironic that Egypt, Bra-
zil, Indonesia and Pakistan, which were among those most vocal in
opposing the Clinton proposal-particularly his statement con-
cerning sanctions-have ratified conventions on all of these sub-
jects, with the exception of Pakistan's failure to ratify a convention
on child labor. 0 They expressed outrage that Clinton would sug-
gest that they should be required to observe the conventions that
they had ratified.
Observance of these core labor rights would have minimal im-
pact on labor costs. 1 To be sure, prohibiting forced labor or child
labor may reduce the supply of labor and thereby increase the
wage level, reducing a country's competitive advantage. The effect
on wages, however, would not measurably reduce an underdevel-
oped country's comparative advantage in labor costs over devel-
oped countries. In any case, the competitive advantage gained by
slavery or child labor is not an advantage to be shielded by free
trade. The same is true of any advantage gained by discrimination.
2s These conventions include the following Convention Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of tie Right to Organize, ILO Convention No. 87 (1948);
Convention Concerning the Application of tie Principles of tir Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively, ILO Convention No. 98 (1949); Convention Concerning Mie Aboli-
tion of Forced Labor;, ILO Convention No. 105 (1957); Convention Concerning Mini-
mum Age for Admission to Employment, 110 Convention No. 138 (1973); Convention
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for lork of Equal Value,
ILO Convention No. 100 (1951); and Convention Concerning Discrimination in Re-
spect of Employment and Occupation, ILO Convention No. 111 (1958).
29 See ILO, DATABASE ON INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, at http://lole.x.ilo.
ch:1567/public/english/50normes/infleg/iloeng/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2001) (providing a tool for visitors to find ratification information by convention).
30 Id.
31 Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Labor Standards and Trade
Agreements, 19 COMiP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ., 145,171,182 (1998).
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Observance of the right to organize and bargain collectively may
ultimately have more impact on wage rates, but none of the coun-
tries objecting to enforcing core labor rights claimed that they were
entitled to a comparative advantage gained by prohibiting workers
from joining unions.
There are a number of other important and widely recognized
labor rights that are not protected by the "core" labor rights: the
right to a safe and healthful place of work, limits on the hours of
work, rights to periods of rest, and protection against abusive
treatment. None of these involve wage rates, and though some of
them might entail labor costs, they would not deny any developing
country the comparative advantage they obtain by offering cheap
labor.
Third, the four core labor rights are more than labor rights;
they are recognized internationally as human rights. The core
rights go beyond those belonging to individuals as workers; they
belong to individuals as human beings. Accordingly, the core
rights have become recognized as human rights. They are articu-
lated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and a number
of other human rights conventions.32 To bar imports because they
have been produced in violation of these rights is not an economic
regulation but a social regulation. The enforcement mechanism is
economic, but the interests protected are human rights. This sig-
nificantly shifts the focus of the free trade debate. The issue is not
simply one of economic efficiency-whether free trade will pro-
mote economic growth-but one of humanitarian concern,
whether free trade serves to promote or deny basic human values.
3. DEVELOPING NATIONS' OPPOSITION TO CORE LABOR RIGHTS
When one focuses on the narrowness of the proposal to con-
sider recognition of core labor rights as a condition of free trade
and the minimal economic impact they would have on developing
countries, one cannot help asking the question, what is all the fuss
about? Why are developing countries so adamant in opposing
even the creation of a working group to study the problem? Em-
pirical studies show that observance of the core labor rights would
not significantly reduce the comparative advantage they gain by
32 See Coxson, supra note 13, at 474-75.
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providing cheap labor.33 In 1992, it cost Nike $5.60 to produce a
pair of shoes in Indonesia which sold for $45.00 to $80.00 in the
United States.34 Any increase in cost from observing core labor
rights would not measurably reduce Indonesia's cost advantage in
producing shoes.
The developing countries expressed fears that these core labor
rights would be used by the developed countries as a guise for
protectionism, but they never articulated how they thought this
might be done. If an importing country could bar all imports from
an exporting country on the claim of violation of one of the core la-
bor rights, then such a claim obviously could be used as a pretext
for protectionism; but if only specific imports could be barred on
proof that they were produced in violation of these rights, the abil-
ity to use the core labor rights for protectionist purposes would
seem to be minimized. The developing countries also expressed
the fear that enforcement of core labor rights was but a camel's
nose in the tent and that other rights would be added that would
significantly reduce their comparative advantage. The WTO, how-
ever, operates on the principle of consensus; presumably, devel-
oping countries could have blocked any such enlargements. The
developed countries declared a willingness to include an express
prohibition against using these rights for protectionism, and to ne-
gotiate details as to application and enforcement. The developing
countries flatly refused to even discuss the subject.
The fears of the developing countries, however, were real, and
not wholly groundless. They feared that the economically power-
ful countries, particularly the United States and the European Un-
ion, despite their protestations of good intentions, would, under
political pressure from industry and unions, find ways to use labor
rights to engage in protectionism. At the time of the Battle in Seat-
33 Citing an OECD study, Professor Hepple states:
Empirical research... indicates that there is no correlation between ag-
gregate real wage growth and the level of observance of core [labor]
rights.... Host states which observe core [labor] standards are not sig-
nificantly worse in attracting FDI [foreign direct investments] than those
which systematically abuse these standards. On the contrary, raising
[labor] standards may raise productivity and so encourage FDI.
Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top. Intenzational Investnent Guidelines and Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 347,349 (1999).
34 Jennifer L. Johnson, Note, Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor
Can Shape Public International Labor Standards, 24 BROOK. J. INW'L L 291, 330 n.83
(1998).
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tle, the United States had 300 dumping duties, quotas on textiles
and other products, plus "voluntary" export restraints by export-
ing countries.35 The European Union countries had major trade
distorting subsidies on agricultural products that they insisted on
retaining.36 There were doubts whether these economically power-
ful countries would, in fact, fully comply with WTO principles. 37
The rule of consensus would not ensure that developed countries
would refrain from pressing for additional labor, environmental,
and human rights. The developing countries would have no real
choice but to consent. Consensus would be more a form than a re-
ality.
There was also a legitimate fear on the part of developing
countries that if they were to prohibit child labor, allow unions and
collective bargaining to thrive, or recognize other labor rights, in-
vestors would move their capital to countries not recognizing such
rights. That fear deters developing countries from reaching bilat-
eral agreements on labor rights. But the WTO can make such stan-
dards equally applicable to all by requiring developed countries
that condition imports on observance of core labor rights to apply
those conditions on imports equally to all countries whether they
are members of the WTO or not. Every country would thus be
protected against a race to the bottom. But developing countries
continue to lack confidence that developed countries will apply the
standards with an even hand.38
Another reason given by the developing countries for their op-
position was that enforcing these core labor rights would invade
their sovereignty.39 Conditioning free trade on recognition of labor
35 See Robert Kuttner, Managed Trade and Economic Sovereignty, in U.S. TRADE
POLICY AND GLOBAL GRoWTH 3 (Robert A. Blecker ed., 1996); Robert E. Scott &
Thea M. Lee, The Costs of Trade Protection Reconsidered: U.S. Steel, Textiles, and Ap-
parel, in U.S. TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL GROWTH 108, supra; JAMES BOVARD, THE
FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
36 The Real Losers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 15.
37 Two months after Seattle, President Clinton, on the urging of the steel in-
dustry and steel unions, imposed punitive tariffs on imports of wire rod and steel
pipe, raising the price of steel imports that exceed a quota pegged at 1998 import
levels. Joseph Kahn, Clinton Imposes Tariffs on Steel Imports That Exceed Quota, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000, at C2.
38 Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International Trade, 25
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165,167 (1993).
39 See generally Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty
Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 117
(1993) (discussing the issue of sovereignty in light of two case studies).
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rights means, in effect, that an importing country may inquire into
and indirectly regulate labor conditions in an exporting country.
Exporting countries would be told that they must protect unioni-
zation and collective bargaining; they would be told how old their
children must be to perform particular jobs, and that regardless of
cultural values, fathers could not be given preference as their fam-
ily's primary breadwinner. In short, a government would be lim-
ited in regulating the work of its own citizens and structuring its
own labor market, and exporting employers would be required to
observe standards set by a foreign country.
Enforcement of core labor rights does encroach on sovereignty,
but only in the very limited degree of requiring countries to protect
fundamental rights, which by their membership in the ILO and
their ratification of ILO conventions and international covenants,
they have agreed to protect. More importantly, invasions of sover-
eignty are a staple of the WTO. Members are presently required to
observe certain protection of intellectual property rights estab-
lished by the WTO of both foreign and domestic works and to pro-
vide enforcement procedures sufficient "to permit effective action
against any act of infringement."40 This will require member
countries, especially developing countries, to make substantial
changes in their national standards and enforcement practices. The
WTO has thereby established international intellectual rights that
member countries are bound to observe and enforce; members
failing to observe and enforce those rights are subject to trade
sanctions4'
40 Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Caimis Under the TRIPs Agree-
ment: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INVL LJ. 357, 331
(1998), quoting Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, LEGAL INStRUMENts-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROuND, vol. 31 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), art. 41(2)(1); see also KEIH E. MAsKUs, REGULATOWY
STANDARDS IN THE WTO: COMPARING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH
COMPETION PoUcY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AND CORE LABoR STANDARDS
(nst. for Inl Econ., Working Paper No. 00-1, 2000), available at http://.w.w.iie.
com/catalog /WP/2000/00-1.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2001); Graeme Dinwoodie,
A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 469,513-521 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bun-
dle" of National Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code, 47 J. COI'YRIGHT SM USA
265 (2000).
41 This led a spokesman for the International Confederation of Trade Unions
to remark: "[tihe WTO's credibility is undermined when it ensures Mickey Mouse
has more rights than workers who make the toys because it covers trademarks but
not labor standards." Cappuyns, supra note 13, at 677.
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A developing country's regulation of capital investments is cir-
cumscribed by the WTO,42 and payment of subsidies to promote
trade and investments comes within its reach. To illustrate its
reach into a country's sovereignty the WTO, acting on a complaint
by the European Union, ordered the United States to amend its tax
code to close a loophole exploited by U.S. transnational enterprises;
the tax break, according to the WTO panel, amounted to a subsidy
in violation of the World Trade Agreement.43 To obtain help from
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, countries
must submit to severe controls over their tax and fiscal policies. 44
When developing countries protest that they should not be re-
quired to observe core labor rights in order to enjoy the benefits of
free access to world markets-and that such requirements would
intolerably infringe upon their sovereignty-their claims ring hol-
low.
It must be recognized that the opposition of developing coun-
tries is encouraged and supported by investors from developed
countries who produce for export.45 They see any limitation on free
trade as a threat to their profits. They have the same fear of the
camel's nose in the tent as they do with any encroachment on the
sovereignty of the market.
On the other side, why have the developed countries, and par-
ticularly the United States, been so insistent on tying free trade to
core labor rights? Among the groups most active and effective in
42 At the Singapore meeting where the WTO rejected the proposal to create a
working group on labor and trade, it named a working group on investment and
trade. See WTO REPORT, supra note 14, at 116.
43 See WTO Report of Appellate Body, United States-Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DIS 108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000). In response to
the Appellate Body's report on Foreign Sales Corporations, the U.S. Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code. See FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. Law No. 10C-519 (H.R. 4986), 114 Stat. 2423. The
European Union stated that in its view, the United States had still failed to comply
and sought permission to levy trade sanctions worth more than $4 billion. Paul
Meller, Europeans Seek $4 Billion in Trade Sanctions Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18,2000, at C1.
44 Dani Rodrik, Governing the Global Economy: Does One Architectural Style Fit
All?, BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM, 105 (1999); Nicole Wendt, The ABC's of the Global
Economy: 50th Anniversary of the World Bank and the IMF Prompts Criticism, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 149 (1999); DOLLARS AND SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2000,
at 26-27.
45 In the 1990s, thirty percent of U.S. corporate profits came from investments
overseas, including many made from the operation of subsidiaries abroad.
Wendt, supra note 44, at 26.
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marshaling the demonstrations in Seattle was the AFL-CIO6 But
what was in it for the AFL-CIO? Tying free trade to core labor
rights would provide U.S. workers no significant protection from
cheap labor in the developing countries, and John Sweeney, Presi-
dent of the AFL-CIO, did not press President Clinton for any more
than this shadowy symbolic gesture. From an economic view-
point, Clinton's proposal and the protestors' insistence made little
sense. One might cynically suspect that President Clinton and
union leaders were playing a shell game, pretending for political
reasons to try to protect workers' jobs from cheap labor abroad.
7
There may be more credible non-economic explanations. Un-
ions and others may have general and legitimate concern for the
welfare of workers beyond our borders. Certainly, it was altruistic
motivations that energized the human rights and environmental
groups to mobilize for the Battle in Seattle. Protection of labor
rights is seen by many as a moral issue, requiring a response be-
yond the bounds of economic self-interest Unions have tradition-
ally been concerned with social values beyond the welfare of their
members; they exhibit a sense of solidarity with other workers. It
is this solidarity which gives many boycotts, domestic and inter-
national, effectiveness. Unions' historic concern for workers other
than their members is sometimes forgotten and often obscured by
the unions' collective bargaining, but it has been manifested in
various ways, including concern for workers in other countries.
Longshoremen have refused to unload goods from communist
countries; unions supported the boycott of South Africa to protest
apartheid 4 8 and U.S. unions have been the leading supporters of
Mexican workers seeking to exercise their right to be represented
by unions of their own choosing. 49 As a nation, we assume an ob-
ligation to provide moral leadership, and so may legitimately as-
46 See Protestors Try to Halt Trade Talks: WTO Meeting in Seattle, FIN. TiEs
(London), Dec. 1,1999, at 1.
47 Such cynicism may be overdrawn. The AFL-CIO praised a trade treaty
with Jordan to eliminate tariffs that commit Jordan to comply with its obligations
under the ILO to safeguard workers' rights. "This is a basic and important step
forward in making globalization work for working families," declared John
Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO. Joseph Kahn, Labor Praises New Trade Pact
with Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,2000, at C1. Republicans expressed skepticism or
flat opposition to this tying of trade to labor rights. Id.
48 Thomas Friedman, Africa: Aid or Harmi?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,2000, at A23.
49 Sam Dillon, U.S. Labor Leader Seeks Union Support in Mexico, N.Y. TiIES,
Jun. 23,1998, at Al.
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sume an obligation to promote human rights wherever they may
be.
President Clinton's insistence on tying free trade to labor or
human rights on moral and social grounds, however, has a discor-
dant note. We have ratified none of the ILO conventions that con-
stitute the core labor rights, and we do not fully comply with
them. We guarantee neither freedom of association nor the right
to bargain collectively as prescribed in Convention No. 87 and No.
98, for we provide no protection for agricultural workers or super-
visors under the National Labor Relations Act, and the federal
government allows its employees only a truncated, nearly mean-
ingless form of collective bargaining,51 and nearly half of the states
deny their public employees the right to bargain collectively. Nor
do we effectively enforce the laws enacted to protect those rights.5 2
Our protection against discrimination is incomplete because we do
not require equal pay for work of equal worth as required by Con-
vention No. 100, which was ratified by 143 countries.5 3 Our moral
sensitivity seems especially dull where trade with China is in-
volved. The proposed trade treaty with China, in more than 200
pages, never mentions labor rights, although China is one of the
worst offenders of core labor rights.5 4 One result of that treaty will
be the entry of China into the WTO, where it could veto any tying
of free trade to labor rights. Our government's position in the
WTO is vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy.
There is another possible explanation for the dispute over tying
free trade to core labor rights, one that is not clearly articulated by
either developed or developing countries. The first core labor
right-and the one considered the most fundamental-is the right
to associate freely, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions are
50 See Coxson, supra note 13, at 471.
51 See UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOcIATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2000) [hereinafter
UNFAIR ADVANTAGE]; James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States
Labor Relations Law : A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMP. RTS. &
EMPLOYEE. POL'Y J. 65, 87-88 (1999).
52 See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1774-86 (1983); see also
UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, supra note 51, ch. V.
53 Breen Creighton, The ILO and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights in
Australia, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 239, 250-51 (1998).
54 See id. at 254 (naming Asia as one of the areas "where abusive child labour
is perceived to be most widespread").
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understandably reluctant to emphasize this right, because doing so
would appear self-serving; moreover, the right to organize and
bargain collectively does not resonate as a human right in the U.S.
political arena. This right may be supported by U.S. unions out of
a sense of solidarity with other unions without any expectation of
economic return. American unions have historically supported
unions in other countries both financially and organizationally.
The large contribution of U.S. unions to the reconstruction of
European unions and the reestablishment of collective bargaining
in Europe after World War I is but one example.55 But U.S. unions
may also have a less altruistic motive: they may hope that the or-
ganization of unions in developing countries will give workers
more bargaining power and enable them to push up wages,
thereby reducing their comparative advantage. They may also
hope that unions in other countries will support them in disputes
with U.S. employers.
For the same reason, the developing countries may resist en-
forcement of the rights of freedom of association and collective
bargaining. They may see unionization and collective bargaining
as potentially reducing their competitive advantage in interna-
tional trade. The calculations of both would seem questionable, for
the unions in most developing countries are now, and will be for
the foreseeable future, too economically weak to compel large
wage increases. Moreover, they are not likely to bargain away all
of their competitive advantage, making exports unprofitable and
destroying their jobs, even if they become strong enough to do so.
Some developing countries may have a greater and more real-
istic fear of enforcing this core labor right for political reasons.
Unions provide a major base for popular organization, and they
regularly focus on political concerns as well as economic concerns.
In developing countries, their political function may be more im-
portant than their economic function. They will, therefore, consti-
tute a challenge to entrenched power of political leaders and insist
on increased recognition of democratic rights.56 Indeed, one of the
reasons freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively
are incorporated in various covenants of human rights is because
these rights serve broader social and political values. Political
55 ROY GORDON, AiRICAN LABOR AND EUROPEAN POLTICS 69-70, 116-22
(1976); ARCHIE ROBINSON, GEORGE MEANY AND His T SE 133-37 (1981).
56 Virginia Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in Co.PA &
DLMOND, supra note 12, at 22-24.
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leaders in developing countries may be understandably reluctant
to articulate this fear, for it would repudiate their claimed adher-
ence to ILO conventions and betray their democratic pretensions.
When one examines the specific issue that President Clinton
put on the table-the one that caused such division as to break up
the meeting-the reaction seems grossly disproportionate to the
proposal. Enforcement of the core labor rights would not deprive
developing countries of their comparative advantage and would
hardly shield workers in developed countries from cheap labor. At
most, it would have a minimal impact on the flow of trade. For
developing countries, a small slice of sovereignty is at stake, but
with regard to investments and protection of intellectual rights,
these countries have already surrendered whole loaves of sover-
eignty to the WTO and other international organs. For developed
countries, the important moral and social values at stake might ex-
plain the insistence in the Seattle streets on core labor rights, but it
is not, politically speaking, obvious that those values were suffi-
ciently compelling to explain putting the WTO and its free trade
accomplishments at risk. We have not balked at trading with, or
even financially supporting, regimes with far more egregious vio-
lations of human rights than the core labor rights. For the devel-
oping countries, the WTO offers the greatest promise of providing
open markets so they can exploit their comparative advantage.
We seem to be left with the unsatisfying answer that the dis-
pute is largely between irreconcilable symbols, sovereignty on the
one side and morality on the other, that are asserted more as ex-
planations of convenience than commitment. I would like to ex-
plore the possibility that the cleavage is at a much different, though
perhaps no less symbolic, level.
In developing countries, the dominant objective is economic
development. This requires capital investment to employ the
abundant labor; capital can be attracted by the prospects of profits
in the export market; and profits depend on how cheaply the
goods can be produced. Because the emphasis is on economic de-
velopment, success is measured in economic terms instead of in so-
cial terms, with the rationale that increased production and in-
creased exports will provide for social welfare by raising the
standard of living. The framework for policy is the economists'
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framework, which measures all policies by economic efficiency;
and for the economist, the free market is the inviolable engine of
efficiency. In international trade, the mantra of economists is that
anything that interferes with free trade interferes with the efficient
allocation of resources. Seldom do they quantify or ask how much
free trade interferes with and impedes development Any interfer-
ence is sufficient reason to reject any restrictions on free trade.e3
This logic is embraced and promoted by transnational corpora-
tions that invest in developing countries to produce goods for ex-
port back to their home country. They object to any restriction on
how or what they produce and therefore oppose any tying of their
labor practices in production to their freedom to export their prod-
ucts.59 The political leaders in developing countries, seeking to at-
tract investments by transnational corporations, embrace the free
trade mantra and see even the smallest restriction on free trade as
an evil threatening their development.
This single-minded pursuit of economic efficiency ignores any
non-economic values that may be involved.P0 Just as the free trade
economists never ask how much a restriction interferes with effi-
ciency, they never ask the other half of the question, what other
values does the restriction serve? In concrete terms, how much ef-
ficiency would be lost by recognition of the four core labor rights,
57 See, e.g., MAsKUS, supra note 40. In evaluating which areas are appropriate
for WTO regulations, he looks only to economic considerations. Because core la-
bor rights have a very limited economic impact, he places regulating those rights
at the bottom of priorities.
53 See ANNE O. KRUEGER, TRADE POUCIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 74-S5
(1995).
-9 See Employers' Group Opposes U.S. Attempt to Link Workers' Rights and Trade,
13 Int!I Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 23 Uune 5,1996).
60 Frank Garcia, The Global Market and Hunman Rights: Trading Away the Human
Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. IN'LL. 51, 65 (1999).
[Tlhere is a marked tendency for other values besides efficiency and wel-
fare to be viewed as outside the scope of trade law .... From the view-
point of Efficiency Model adherents, advocates of non-trade values and
issues are seen as trying to complicate the trade law system with what
are at best extraneous concerns, such as human rights or environmental
protection, and what may be at worst simply disguised protectionism.
Id. At the 1999 WTO meeting in Geneva, the so-called High Level Symposium on
Trade and Development, the greatest applause arrived when T.N. Srinivasan
called for vigorously divorcing all "non issues" from trade negotiations; the obvi-
ous implication is that the WTO should not even look at issues relating to labor
and the environment FRED BERGSTEN, DIScUSSION, BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM, 195
(1997).
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and how much would such recognition further human rights?
There is no attempt to measure and balance; free trade becomes a
doctrinal principle, not a variable value.
Free trade enthusiasts echo the laissez-faire disciples of the 19th
century, but with a more sophisticated scripture and a more de-
voted worship of the market.61 Any limitation on the free market
violates the economists' First Commandment: Thou shalt have no
gods before me. The free market will provide for all. In the Pan-
glossian observation of an unnamed trade official, "there is no
need for an active international labor standards policy. . . be-
cause a well functioning market will ensure development of ap-
propriate standards consistent with the desires of the participants
in the market."
Some highly regarded economists argue that the observation of
labor standards will hurt those whom the regulations are intended
to help. Using an often repeated example, they argue that if child
labor is prohibited in a developing country it will deprive poor
countries of desperately needed income, and the children not
working will be on the streets as beggars, prostitutes, or street
criminals.62 That logic, however, is factually flawed. Similar ar-
guments were made against child labor laws in England and the
United States a hundred years ago63 but have long since been dis-
carded.. Experience indicates that their arguments are equally
flawed now for developing countries. The Rugmark program has
reduced child labor in the Indian carpet industry,64 and Nike has
eliminated children in stitching soccer balls in Pakistan.65 The jobs
are now held by the fathers and mothers, more children are in
school, and we still buy the rugs and soccer balls.
61 See KRUEGER, supra note 58, at 74-85.
62 See Nancy Birdsall, Life Is Unfair: Inequality in the World, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1998, at 87-88; Mark Warner, Globalization and Human Rights: An Economic
Model, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 99, 104 (1999); The Standard Question, ECONOMIST, Jan.
15, 2000, at 79. Paul Krugman has been quoted as saying, "A policy of good jobs
in principle, but no jobs in practice might assuage our consciences but is no favor
to its beneficiaries." Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 31, at 153.
63 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 71 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(citing the Eighteenth Annual Report by the New York Bureau of Statistics of La-
bor).
64 See Janet Hilowitz, Social Labeling to Combat Child Labor: Some Considerations,
136 INT'L LAB. REv. 215, 224 (1997).
65 Press Release, President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the ILO
Conference in Geneva, Switz. (June 16,1999) (citing soccer ball industry's change
of policy in Pakistan).
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We have long recognized that the "invisible hand" does not see
those who are hurt by the market and that limitations are neces-
sary to protect social values that the market ignores. We have en-
acted a network of labor laws that place limitations on market
forces in order to protect workers' health, safety, the right to asso-
ciate, the right to equal treatment, and a wide range of other social
values. Those who oppose any conditioning of free trade on rec-
ognition of the most fundamental labor rights proceed from an un-
compromising laissez-faire 66 premise that the international market
should be left completely free of labor regulations, a premise that
has been rejected by every industrial country in promoting its in-
ternal economy.
One might thoughtlessly say that how a country regulates its
own labor market is that country's business. Each country should
decide what social policies it should recognize and promote for its
people. Whether India allows its children to work, Afghanistan
prohibits its women from working, or China prohibits unions and
collective bargaining-none of this is our concern. We should not
condition imports from another country on that country's choice of
labor policy or its labor practices.
But is it none of our concern? Are we not entitled, indeed obli-
gated, to insist on our common humanity? Cannot, indeed, should
not, our concern for how workers are treated transcend national
boundaries? Certainly, as individuals we may refuse to buy goods
produced under conditions that we find morally repugnant, not
only to pressure for change, but to avoid participating in, and
benefiting from, morally repugnant practices. It seems to me that
we, as a nation, can appropriately bar imports produced under
conditions that offend our common moral sensibilities, particularly
when the world community shares those sensibilities. We can
rightly choose to forgo the comparative advantage of free trade in
66 Warner, supra note 62, at 105. Warner states,
Where ... international consensus exists, I believe that we all as intelli-
gent fully informed humans, can make the choice to have a lesser degree
of global welfare, a lesser degree of the productive and distributive effi-
ciency that gives rise to that global welfare, because there are certain
higher values to which we all agree.
Id. Despite this genuflection to "higher values", the economic approach prevailed,
for Warner would give a presumption in favor of free markets except in a "narrow
class of egregious human rights violations," such as genocide and apartheid. Id.
at110.
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cheaper shoes and shirts and rugs produced by child labor rather
than support and participate in a labor practice that we have for
nearly one hundred years declared socially and morally intoler-
able. We might remember that this was our response to apartheid,
and we might note that the WTO explicitly allows such action in
the case of forced labor.67 As Professor Hepple has said, "The
struggle to restrain the unbridled power of 'transnational corpora-
tions' is the greatest task of contemporary 'labor' law."68
4. THE WTO's ROLE IN PROMOTING LABOR RIGHTS
Beyond the appropriateness of our individual or national con-
duct is the appropriateness of action by the WTO. If an interna-
tional organization is to establish an open global market and en-
force international free trade, does it not have an obligation to
place limits on that market to protect internationally recognized
social and human values? 69 It is the only international structure
with the capacity to curb the market forces it has unleashed.
The Battle in Seattle was a battle in the continuing clash of
worldviews. On the one side were those who see the world in eco-
nomic terms. For them, free trade is an inviolable principle that
promotes economic development and works for the economic
benefit of all. Any regulation limiting that freedom violates that
principle and undermines its benefits. On the other side were
67 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"), Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX,
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188,262 (allowing exemptions from free trade "to protect
public morals"). In 1995, the WTO began enforcing the GATr. See WTO, 1 GUIDE
TO GATr LAW AND PRACrIcE 8 (1995). Article XX(e) allows the banning of imports
made by prison labor. See Christopher S. Armstrong, American Import Controls and
Morality in International Trade: An Analysis of Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 8
N.Y.U. J. L. INT'L L. & POL 19 (1975) (discussing the legislative history of GATT
and its implications regarding policy considerations).
6 Hepple, supra note 33, at 362.
69 For a comprehensive analysis of the tension between free trade and social
values in the WTO, see Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
658 (1996). Professor Howse argues that the provision in GATT that the obliga-
tion to provide treatment as favorable to imports as that provided to domestic
products should allow a country to exclude products that are produced under
standards prohibited by the importing country's laws. Robert Howse, Making
Home for Human Rights at the WTO, L. QUADRANGLE NOTEs, Summer 2000. How-
ever, in the Tuna/Dolphin case, it was held that this related only to the physical
characteristics of the product, not the manner of their production. Id. (citing
GATT Dispute Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (June 16,
1994)). Therefore, the United States could not exclude tuna caught in nets that
killed dolphins. Id.
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those who see the world in social and moral terms. They see free
trade as needing regulation to protect and promote non-economic
values of human rights, the environment, and labor rights. The
Battle in Seattle was in essence a battle of principle.
It should be noted that President Clinton's proposal was one of
narrowly-limited principle; it was limited to the four core labor
rights. There are other commonly recognized labor rights that
have claims for protection of the market: the right to a safe and
healthy work place, protection from excessive hours of work, pro-
tection from abusive treatment, and protection from violence. He
did not even mention other human rights or protection of the envi-
ronment. The opposition to his proposal was laissez-faire absolut-
ism: there should not be even the most minimum limitations on
international free trade. With such absolutism, compromise was
foreclosed. The parties could not rise above principle to seek a bal-
ance between free trade and societal values. There was no ability
to even consider engaging in a study to find such a balance.
This perspective fails to consider one of the most energizing
motives in this country for such vocal opposition to free trade: U.S.
workers' fear that competing goods imported from low wage
countries will rob the U.S. workforce of countless jobs. It was
largely this fear that mobilized local unions and union members.
When imports of manufactured goods were small, this fear was
limited, but in the last fifty years, those imports have multiplied
and those fears have multiplied. 70 The free movement of capital,
made more free and protected by the WTO, has aggravated those
fears as U.S. employers have closed plants, moved production to
countries with low labor costs, and shipped the products back to
this country to compete with products made here.n When NAFTA
was negotiated, it could not win congressional approval until a la-
bor side agreement was negotiated for the declared purpose of
protecting workers from "that giant sucking sound" south of the
border.72 It was this same fear of job losses that led to the defeat of
70 See Mark Weisbrot, Globalization for ~izom?, 31 CoRNEL INVL UJ. 631, 642
(1998).
71 See id. at 633-40.
72 Mike Morton & Sabra Morton, Galore v. Sore Sport, N.Y. TMFs, Nov. 9,1993,
at Al (quoting Ross Perot); see also Patrick Buchanan, Giant Sucting Sound: Part II,
INTERNET BRIGADE, June 26, 1998, at http://www.buchanan.org/pg-90626.html
(discussing NAFTA related job losses).
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fast track authority for negotiating with Chile and to the strenuous
resistance to the China trade treaty.
It is argued that free trade increases exports and provides new
jobs; we are regularly given unsubstantiated statements touting the
number of new jobs created by exports. But free trade also in-
creases imports with a loss of jobs, and we are not told of the jobs
lost. It is quite clear that the number of jobs gained is less than the
number of jobs lost. It is estimated that the net loss of jobs to Can-
ada and Mexico since NAFTA has been between 250,000 and
450,000.73 The reason is obvious. The imports from low wage
countries are predominantly labor-intensive, while exports to such
countries are predominantly capital-intensive. If there were a dol-
lar balance of imports and exports, the imports would represent
more jobs than the exports, resulting in a net job loss. But there is
not a dollar balance of trade. The annual trade deficit with Mexico
since NAFTA has been between $14.7 billion and $15 billion, and
with Canada $18.5 billion.74 This translates into an increased net
deficit of more than 400,000 in jobs. The same pattern applies to
other developing countries; on a global basis our annual trade defi-
cit is more than $250 billion,75 which translates into a deficit of
many more jobs.76
73 It was estimated by the Economic Policy Institute that after three years,
420,000 jobs had been lost. The Failed Experiment: NAFTA at Three Years, PUBLIC
CITIZEN, GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/
reports/epijointhtm. (last visited Jan. 27, 2001). After five years, 215,000 workers
were certified as laid off under the U.S. Department of Labor NAFTA Trade Ad-
justment Assistance Program. See SCHOOL OF REAL LIFE RESULTS REPORT CARDS,
PUB11C CITIZEN GLOBAL TRADE WATCH (Dec. 1998), at http://www.citizen.org/
pctrade/nafta/reports/5years.htm. Many workers do not even know the assis-
tance program exists and many others do not apply for assistance. See ROBERT A.
BLECKER, The Political Economy of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in U.S.
TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL GROWTH, supra note 35, at 136, 144 (explaining that al-
ternative methods to estimate the outflow of direct foreign investment and to
translate investment reductions into job losses result in estimates of joblessness
due to NAFTA ranging from 260,000 to 490,000 for the period of 1992 to 2000).
74 SCHOOL OF REAL LIFE RESULTS REPORT CARDS, PUBLIC CITIZEN GLOBAL TRADE
WATCH, supra note 73.
75 CATHERINE MANN, Is THE U.S. TRADE DmCIT SUSTAINABLE? (1999). Mann
also notes that the deficit on goods was even greater because of a surplus of serv-
ices. See id. at 34-36.
76 Dale Belman & Thelma Lee, International Trade and Performance of U.S. Labor
Markets, in U.S. TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL GROWTH, supra note 35, at 61-63; Erick-
son & Mitchell, supra note 31, at 178-79 (arguing that the deficit is the primary
cause of the fact).
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As a result of their experience in the global market, workers,
particularly those in manufacturing industries, know that free
trade threatens their job security, that the products they make will
be driven out of the market by competing products made by cheap
labor abroad, and that their plants may be moved abroad to take
advantage of cheap labor. The fear has, for the time being, been
only partially dulled by present full employment, but it remains
real and justified rZ
The union movement has for the last fifty years been a strong
advocate of free trade, though that has not prevented it from
pressing for protection against the consequences of free trade when
particular industries suffer from foreign competition, as did the
auto industry in the 1980s78 and the steel industry in the 1990s.P
Unions are not prepared to repudiate outright their policy of free
trade, though because of the NAFTA experience they did block ne-
gotiations with Chile for a free trade agreement.90 Unions accept in
principle the economic argument that free trade increases our eco-
nomic welfare, but they fear its consequences for the workers af-
fected. Tom by this conflict, they have eased it by supporting free
trade subject to protection of core labor rights, even though this
does little to reduce the reasons to fear. To the extent that opposi-
tion to free trade is fueled by fear of job losses, it is a rejection of
the economic reasoning of comparative advantage.
From this perspective, the Battle in Seattle was a battle on two
fronts. On one front, it was a battle between the worshipers of effi-
ciency and the missionaries of human and social rights. On the
other front, it was a battle between those who pursued the claimed
economic gains of comparative advantage and those who rejected,
a least in part, its economic consequences.
77 Economists do not agree whether the trade deficit affects jobs. See, e.g.,
Robert Scott & Jesse Rothstein, American Jobs and thw Asian Crisis: 71w Employment
Impact of the Coming Rise in the U.S. Trade Deficit, EcoN. POuCY INsT., BRIEING
PAPER, (Apr. 14, 1998) (finding that if the US. trade deficit increases as predicted,
some 1.5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs will be eliminated). See aLso KRUEG,
supra note 58, at 48 (pointing out that "trade deficits widen when US. economic
growth is good and job opportunities abound, and shrinks when an economic
slowdown occurs and the unemployment rate rises").
78 See Kuttner, supra note 35, at 6.
79 See id. at 26.
s0 Christel Fonzo-Eberhard, Chilean Trade vs. American Gridlock, YALE IWL
FORUM ON-uNE, Summer 1996, available at http://w.yale.edu/ifonum/
summerl996/grandstandsSum96.htm#Chilean Trade vs. American GridlocL.
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This perspective requires us to examine more carefully the un-
derlying premise of comparative advantage, which is accepted al-
most universally by economists, and is not directly challenged by
those who would impose restrictions on free trade. I am not pre-
pared to question here the general theory that if each country can
produce the goods in which it has a comparative advantage and
freely exchange them for goods in which another country has a
comparative advantage, the overall economic welfare of both
counties will benefit. The theory of comparative advantage, how-
ever, gives us limited guidance on the question of whether free
trade should be tied to certain labor rights, because it focuses only
on economic efficiency and excludes consideration of societal val-
ues.
First, the theory omits consideration of the distribution of eco-
nomic gains. Each country may have a net economic gain, but
there are inevitably winners and losers in each country. Goods
imported into the United States, particularly those from develop-
ing countries, are predominantly labor intensive goods that can be
produced by lower skilled and unskilled workers: shoes, textiles,
clothing, toys, and assembly of cars, household appliances and
electronics.81 As a result, the losers in the United States at the pres-
ent time are primarily workers in manufacturing industries, par-
ticularly those with fewer skills. They are the low wage workers
who have the greatest difficulty finding other jobs and generally
end up with jobs paying less than the ones they lost due to in-
creased imports. The winners are those hired in the new jobs cre-
ated by increased exports, which are predominantly in capital-
intensive industries. They are predominantly the highly trained
workers who are higher paid and in short supply in the present job
market. The loss is imposed on those lower in the income scale,
namely, minorities and women; the gain is enjoyed by those with
more education and higher incomes.82 The loss has thereby con-
tributed to the growing disparity of wealth and inequality in our
society.83 United States workers sense this reality. Two-thirds of
81 See WOODWARD, infra note 88.
82 See Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 31, at 177, tbl. 4; Andrew Kohut, Glob-
alization and the Wage Gap, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3,1999, at A31 (citing the survey by the
Pew Research Center).
83 See Belman & Lee, supra note 76, at 72-78 (demonstrating that there is a
body of evidence on hand to demonstrate that international trade has caused
wages and employment to decline in the U.S. manufacturing industry and that
[22:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss1/2
BATTLE IN SEATTLE
those earning more than $75,000 per year believe that they will be
better off as a result of the global economy, while two-thirds of
those earning less than $50,000 believe they will be worse off.P
The very process of moving jobs from importing industries to
exporting industries is disruptive, particularly for the workers af-
fected. Rodrik has estimated that the disruptive effects of moving
production will be five times the net gain. Insofar as we value sta-
bility in workers' lives and greater equality, these must be counted
as not only economic costs but societal costs of free trade.P
There are also winners and losers in the developing countries.
Those who obtain jobs in the export industries are the winners; al-
though their wages are low, they often earn more than they would
elsewhere. Those who do not obtain jobs are not so much losers as
left behind.86 The losers in many developing countries are those
who go to the cities with the expectation of jobs, only to find un-
employment, hunger, and squalid living conditions and are often
worse off than they were before. As in the United States, the effect
is to increase the inequality in society. Studies have shown that in
most developing countries, inequality between the bottom forty
percent and the top sixty percent has significantly increased with
free trade.8 That inequality must be counted as a social cost of free
trade.
There is a third level of inequality-that between developed
countries and developing countries. In theory, global integration
will bring economic convergence; lowering barriers to interna-
tional trade should in principle reduce the degree of inequality.
Studies indicate, however, that this has not in fact always occurred.
Although there has been convergence in Southern Europe and East
Asia, there has been increased divergence in other areas. In rela-
international trade accounts for 10-20% of the increase in wage inequality in the
United States in the last decade).
8 See DANi RODRIK, HAS GLOBAUZATION GONE Too FAR? 14-18 (1997); Kohut,
supra note 82.
85 In describing the impact of NAFTA, Robert Blecker observed, "significant
dislocation can be expected and the wage effects are likely to be negative. In fact,
the distributional implications of NAFTA are almost the reverse of what free trade
economists claim for trade liberalization." Robert A. Blecker, Th7 Political Economy
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in US. TRADE PoucY AND GLOBAL
GROTvrH, supra note 35, at 164.
85 See id.
87 WOODWARD, infra note 88.
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tive terms, the poor countries have become poorer.88 The countries
that have developed the fastest, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
Southeast Asia, and China have done so with the most restrictive
trade practices.8 9
Second, the theory is incomplete because it does not tell us
what differentials in labor costs should count as a legitimate com-
parative advantage entitling it to protection in a free trade regime.
Does the availability of slave labor entitle a country to claim that its
comparative advantage gained by such labor should not be denied
by restrictions on free trade in the products of slave labor? In its
earliest and simplest expression by Ricardo, the reasoning was that
where countries had a comparative advantage because of differ-
ences in availability of natural resources, then free trade in those
resources was mutually beneficial. Where one country has avail-
able a supply of cheap labor, this might be viewed as a compara-
tive advantage in a natural resource entitling that country to its
benefits. But should the availability of child labor, or the willing-
ness of women to work for less than men, be counted as a legiti-
mate comparative advantage entitling that country to claim its
benefits through free access to the international market? Should a
country, by prohibiting unions and collective bargaining, be able to
claim a comparative advantage entitled to protection? The same
problem is posed by other labor conditions that may affect the
costs of production-dangerous and unhealthy work, long hours
of work, lack of rest periods. Neither Ricardo nor present day
economists tell us what should or should not count as a compara-
tive advantage when dealing with the labor factor of production.
Economists do not tell us what should or should not count as a
comparative advantage, because their theories simply describe
how the market works.
Comparative advantage is measured in terms of the costs of
production, with an indifference to how those costs are constituted.
If a country can produce cheaper goods by using slave labor, the
theory of comparative advantage simply tells us that free trade
with a country that permits slave labor will be economically bene-
ficially to both. The free labor country will benefit from the low
88 For a description and explanation of this phenomenon, see DAVID
WOODWARD, GLOBALIZATION, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY (U.N. Dev.
Prog., Working Paper, 1998).
89 Jessica Collins & John Miller, Know-Nothings and Know-it-Alls: iat's
Wrong with the Hype About Globalization, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 41.
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prices of the imported goods made with slave labor. The theory
does not tell us whether the rules of international trade should
guarantee an open market for slave-made goods. It does not tell us
whether an importing free labor country should be allowed to
forgo the benefit of a lower price and bar the import of slave-made
goods. The theory is similarly unable to tell us whether an im-
porting country should be allowed, for non-economic reasons, to
restrict the importation of goods made by child labor or by women
paid less than men, produced under dangerous or unhealthful
conditions, or by workers required to work intolerable hours with-
out rest. The argument that free trade requires recognition of a
country's comparative advantage regardless of the source of that
advantage legitimates labor conditions that violate fundamental
rights. The argument here is not that comparative advantage
should not be considered in determining the rules of international
trade, but rather that it should not be the sole consideration. It
speaks only to economic benefits, but there are other social and
moral values to be considered.
This brings us back to the beginning. The protesters in the Bat-
tle in Seattle were not, in the words of the Economist "militant
dunces parading their ignorance through the streets of Seattle'"90
Fundamental values were at stake. On one side were those who,
proceeding from the theory of comparative advantage insisted that
international trade should be unrestricted regardless of the source
of that advantage. This, it is argued, is essential for economic de-
velopment and general economic welfare; the value of economic
gain is the sole consideration. On the other side were those who
insisted that a comparative advantage, when gained by denying
fundamental rights, should not be entitled to protection in the in-
ternational market. Economic development should not be bought
at the expense of all other social values.
Although there is a dash of values, a livable compromise is
possible. Developing countries can retain their legitimate com-
parative advantages while recognizing at least minimum funda-
mental values. As it was pointed out earlier, recognition of the
four core labor rights would increase costs minimally, if at all. It
was the WTO's adamant refusal to recognize any social values
other than the economic that fueled the fervor in the streets of Se-
attle.
90 See The New Trade War, supra note 7.
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There was the second clash, that between those who sought the
benefits of free trade based on comparative advantage and those
who feared its consequences. Compromise here is more difficult, if
not impossible. Introduction of free trade inevitably means loss of
jobs in importing industries, and those put out of work can seldom
be channeled into the new jobs created by exports. Mobility of
capital has doubled this impact of free trade. Domestic plants are
closed, production is moved to low wage countries and the prod-
ucts are shipped back. Employees in the closed plants lose their
jobs, and some workers in the remaining plants also lose their jobs
because of the low cost imports produced by the relocated plants.
Most of the displaced workers, even in a period of full employment
end up in poorer jobs or unemployed.91 Clash here is inevitable
and we should not denigrate those who protest as "militant
dunces." They know they are being hurt by free trade and under-
standably protest. But to relieve their pain would require denying
developing countries of all their comparative advantage in lower
labor costs regardless of the source.
Because society as a whole benefits from free trade, then society
has an obligation to aid those who bear the pain so that others
might enjoy the gains. There is probably no fully adequate answer.
At a minimum, those displaced should be aided in making the
transition to other jobs. This is the declared purpose of the Trade
Act of 1974,92 which has provision for special assistance for work-
ers whose jobs are adversely affected by competing imports. The
primary benefit is extended unemployment compensation. Job
training is nominally required, and counseling, job search assis-
tance and relocation allowances are nominally available through
state agencies.93 But only one out of three receiving employment
benefits obtain any of these other services. Similar provisions were
statutorily made for those displaced as a result of NAFTA 94 with
91 See Smith infra note 92.
92 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1994); Mary Ann Joseph, Trade Adjustment Assistance: An
Analysis, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 251 (1990); Whitney John Smith, Trade Adjustment As-
sistance: An Underdeveloped Alternative to Import Restrictions, 56 ALB. L. REv. 943
(1993).
93 Unemployed workers can get two years at approved colleges or vocational
training with a monthly stipend of $245, cost of job seeking, and relocation costs.
Only half of those entitled to school or job training and only one in ten got jobs
they trained for. Debra Beach, Restraining Lifeline Fails to Reach Some Jobless, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 6 1994, at Al.
94 19 U.S.C. § 3203 (1994) (providing for job training).
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equally meager substance. 95 These programs point in the right di-
rection, but because of limited benefits, inadequate training pro-
grams, and weak administration, they take only mincing steps to-
ward meeting the need.96 The primary failure results from our
unwillingness to appropriate adequate funds. In simplest terms
we are unwilling to pay taxes to meet this social obligation. We are
anxious to enjoy the benefits of free trade and willing to let low
wage workers bear the burden.
5. CONCLUSION
Uncompromising insistence that free trade should in no way be
conditioned on observance of core labor rights is rooted in the un-
articulated premise that recognition of basic human rights is eco-
nomically inefficient. A developing country that recognizes these
rights will discourage investment necessary for development
Capital, which moves freely across national boundaries, will flow
to those countries that do not protect such rights. If that premise is
factually valid, which is not beyond doubt, or if it is accepted as
valid, then every developing country will try to attract potential
investors by lowering standards and giving investors a freer hand
than other countries competing in seeking investments. All coun-
tries will be caught in a race to the bottom; none can economically
afford to recognize and protect basic labor rights.
Developing countries can be protected from the race to the
bottom only if all are equally subject to pressures to recognize basic
labor rights. There is no international agency other than the WTO
able to effectively exert pressure for observance of rights on a
global basis. For the WTO to disclaim responsibility and say that
the task should be left to the "appropriate body"-the powerless
ILO-is transparent criticism. There is no likelihood that the ILO
can or will be given the ability to do more than make reports and
9 The only workers eligible are those who produce a product that is directly
affected by NAFTA, effectively excluding service and retail workers and manu-
facturing workers indirectly affected. Retraining and assistance expenditures
have been $418 for each laid off worker. SCHOOL OF REAL LIFE RESULTS REFow
CARDS, PuBUc CmzEN GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, supra note 73 (providing calcula-
tions based on number of workers certified up to May 1998 and the money spent
on workers documented by Journal of Commerce, May 13,1993).
9 For a critical analysis of these programs, see Paul T. Decker & Walter Cor-
son, International Trade and Worker Displacement: Evaluation of thle Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL REv. 758 (1995).
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issue statements that are regularly disregarded by countries vio-
lating the conventions they have signed.
The WTO is the one international agency with the ability to ex-
ert pressure on all countries to observe these rights. Not by itself
directly enforcing these rights, or by requiring the government of
any country to enforce these rights, but by not extending its pro-
tection to goods produced in violation of these rights, and allowing
any member country to burden imports of such products. Article
XX of GATT can be simply amended to provide that products pro-
duced under conditions violating basic labor rights shall not be
protected from duties, quotas, or embargoes that any country
chooses to levy. This will not bar such products in international
trade for some importing countries may be indifferent to violation
of some or all of these rights. But it will enable those countries
who do object to violations of these basic rights to bar products of
such violations, and thereby pressure producers in the exporting
countries to observe these rights.
There would, of course, be practical administrative problems of
identifying the particular products that were produced in violation
of the basic rights. In addition, over time there would almost in-
evitably be demands to expand the protected rights beyond the
four core labor rights. But it is important, for the future evolution
of free trade toward lifting living standards in all countries, to ar-
ticulate the principle that free trade is not an absolute, and that the
freedom of international trade is subject to observance of intema-
tionaly recognized basic human rights.
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